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ERRONEOUSLY MEANDERED
LAKESHORE-THE STATUS OF THE LAW AS IT
AFFECTS TITLE AND DISTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION
Modern affluence and increased interest in outdoor recrea-
tional activities have spurred the demand for lake and country
real estate in recent times. Wisconsin's northern woodlands,
particularly those bordering the numerous lakes of the region,
have been especially popular. Disgruntled urbanites are discov-
ering the many pleasurable aspects of country living and rural
landowners are enjoying the prosperity which land develop-
ment brings. However, progress has its price, and this recent
interest in northern Wisconsin property has renewed an old
legal problem which is certain to become a source of contro-
versy as more people seek their own piece of vacation land.
Many unsuspecting purchasers of such lands may one day find
themselves involved in disputes over title to parcels of lake-
shore property which were either mistakenly or fraudulently
omitted from the original government surveys and plats. Un-
fortunately, the rules of law applicable to such disputes are
cryptic and uncertain, although recently the Wisconsin Su-
peme Court has begun to reduce the confusion. This article will
examine and discuss these rules and their application to con-
temporary title problems in Wisconsin.
ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM
While the forests that once stretched across most of Wiscon-
sin were originally seen as the state's most valuable resource,
there are few who would dispute that the state's lakes and
streams are equally important today. Wisconsin's northern
counties have one of the largest concentrations of lakes any-
where on earth, a result of the last great glacial advance across
the northern United States.1 The presence of these numerous
lakes caused many hardships for the private surveying crews
which contracted with the federal government to survey the
region between 1830 and 1866. These crews, often poorly
trained and inexperienced, were frequently hard pressed to
1. For a discussion of Wisconsin's glacial history, see LaBastile, On the Trail of
Wisconsin's Ice Age, NAT'L GEOG., Aug. 1977, at 189.
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keep ahead of timber trespassers. This pressure, combined with
the inherent difficulty of surveying a wilderness dotted with
lakes and streams, led to a large number of mistakes in chart-
ing the meander lines of northern lakes.2
The government officials supervising the projects were not
particularly concerned with the exact detail of these lake
boundaries, as they were primarily interested in ascertaining
the approximate acreage so that the forested uplands could be
sold.3 The surveyors merely submitted field plats of their work
and their notes to the government. The survey would be ac-
cepted unless the plats did not correspond to the notes. Drafts-
men then divided the plats by quarter lines and subdivided
lands which were less than complete quarter sections because
of a meandered body of water into government lots.' The ab-
sence of an effective check on the work of the surveying crews
resulted in many lakes being erroneously or fraudualently mis-
represented on the official plats.
Most of the early disputes which arose because of inaccur-
ate surveys involved timber companies quarreling over bound-
aries to tracts of standing timber. These companies were eager
to move on to uncut areas as soon as the timber could be
removed, and usually had no interest in becoming entangled in
lengthy court battles over title to the timberlands.' Those few
disputes that did reach the Wisconsin Supreme Court usually
2. Meander lines are run in surveying fractional portions of the public lands
bordering upon navigable rivers, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the
purpose of defining the sinuosities of the banks of the stream, and as the means
of ascertaining the quantity of the land in the fraction subject to sale . the
water course, and not the meander-line, is the boundary.
St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 286 (1868).
Meander lines are not per se boundary lines, and were not so intended. They
are a series of straight lines, roughly blocking out the sinuosities'of the banks of
larger bodies of waters and streams, and were run for the purpose of computing
the area of lands bounded on such waters.
Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REV. 305, 306 (1940).
For similar definitions of "meander line" see Weaver v. Knudson, 23 Wis. 2d 426,
430, 127 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1963) and BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF SUR-
VEYING INSTRUCTIONS § 226, at 230 (1947).
3. See generally, Schultz v. Winther, 10 Wis. 2d 1, 101 N.W.2d 631 (1960).
4. The system for the survey of public lands is set forth in 43 U.S.C. §§ 752, 753
(1970). The federal scheme of surveying is described in H. Tuttle, Title to Wisconsin
Lakelands Not Shown on the Government Plat (Feb. 16, 1928) (paper presented to the
Wisconsin Society of Engineers).
5. Although litigation was infrequent, some cases did materialize. See, e.g., North-
ern Pine Land Co. v. Bigelow, 84 Wis. 157, 54 N.W. 496 (1893); Whitney v. Detroit
Lumber Co., 78 Wis. 240, 47 N.W. 425 (1890).
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involved controversies arising after lumber companies had
cleared most of the available forest land, and frequently in-
volved title to meandered lakeshore property.
The development of the law on the subject was sporadic and
the early decisions were fraught with inconsistency-a hobgob-
lin that has remained with the law to this day. To better under-
stand the present law on the subject, it is necessary to analyze
the early cases which are responsible for much of the current
confusion.
THE CHOICE OF LAW QUESTION
One of the first problems encountered in any question in-
volving boundaries or title to erroneously meandered property
in Wisconsin is determining whether to apply state or federal
law. When confronted with this question, the courts have given
contradictory answers. The decisions of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court have not settled the issue.
In the 1899 case of Mendota Club v. Anderson, I the Wiscon-
sin court declared that the state could not apply its own law
to determine the extent of land grants by the United States
government. Yet, eleven years later the court seemed to modify
that language by stating in Farris v. Bentley7 that it is "well
settled that where the United States grants lands bounded by
streams and makes no reservation or restriction, the grant will
be given effect according to the law of the state in which the
land lies." Subsequent Wisconsin cases have at times applied
both of these rules.8 However, much of this apparent inconsis-
tency can be resolved by looking to the federal decisions which
served as precedent for the two rules.
The two United States Supreme Court cases cited most
often in Wisconsin decisions on the choice of law question are
Hardin v. Jordan' and Mitchell v. Smale.1° The issue in the
Hardin case was whether the title of a riparian owner" ex-
6. 101 Wis. 479, 78 N.W. 185 (1899).
7. 141 Wis. 671, 674, 124 N.W. 1003, 1004 (1910).
8. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Voss, 197 Wis. 461, 219 N.W. 100 (1929) (following
Farris); Reedal v. Brothertown Realty Co., 200 Wis. 465, 227 N.W. 390 (1930) (follow-
ing Mendota).
9. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
10. 140 U.S. 406 (1891).
11. In J. GOULD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS, 297 (3d ed. 1900) the author notes
that "the word 'riparian' is relative to the bank, and not to the bed of the stream." In
1978]
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tended to the center of a nonnavigable lake or stopped at the
water's edge. Declaring that state law governed the determina-
tion, the Court referred only to the states' right to regulate
submerged lands which belong to them in their sovereign ca-
pacity.' 2 It thus seems that the rule has been misapplied to
cases involving unsurveyed uplands, where the critical inquiry
is whether title extends to the water's edge. The status of title
to the submerged lands lying beyond the high water mark
should not affect the determination of ownership of the adja-
cent lands that have never been covered by water. Much of the
difficulty experienced in Wisconsin and throughout the coun-
try"3 is attributable to extensions of the Hardin doctrine to
inappropriate fact situations.
In Mitchell v. Smale"4 the plaintiff claimed title under a
patent issued to his ancestor to a twenty-five acre peninsula
which had been omitted from the official government survey.
The Court there held that the authority of the United States
to dispose of public lands was a matter of federal law and that
federal law determines the extent of federal patents. Since the
disputed parcel in Mitchell did not involve any previously sub-
merged areas, the extent of the grant was not determined under
state law.
Much of the confusion in the early Wisconsin cases is attrib-
utable to the court's failure to distinguish the factual bases of
the Hardin and Mitchell rules before applying them to the
cases presented. Several recent cases illustrate the proper ap-
plication of the Supreme Court's choice-of-law rules.
In Hughes v. Washington 5 the United States Supreme
Court considered the status of title to land formed by accretion
along property bordering on the Pacific Ocean. The petitioner's
this article, the ownership rights and privileges in lakes will be referred to as "riparian"
because of its common usage, even though the term "littoral" more accurately de-
scribes these rights and privileges.
12. The principle case supporting this proposition is Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324
(1876), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the states' jurisdiction in
such cases was limited to riparian rights incidental to their title to submerged lands
which were acquired at statehood.
13. The large number of lakes in Minnesota have created problems with meandered
shoreline similar to those encountered in Wisconsin. For a discussion of the law in that
state see Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REv. 305
(1940).
14. 140 U.S. 406 (1891).
15. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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predecessor in interest received title to the oceanfront property
through a United States government grant. However, the State
of Washington also claimed ownership to the accreted lands by
virtue of its statehood. A majority of the Court held that the
owner of shoreline property bounded by navigable water who
claims under a federal grant acquires the right to accretions.
In so ruling, the Court declared that the question was one of
federal law. The decision was based upon the principle an-
nounced in Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,"6 that the validity and
extent of federal grants, and the location of the boundary be-
tween upland and tideland are questions which must be deter-
mined under federal law.
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Hughes, explained that,
the law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the
individual States to develop and administer. And surely
Washington or any other State is free to make changes, either
legislative or judicial, in its general rules of real property law,
including the rules governing the property rights of riparian
owners."
Today, the Supreme Court's position on the question is rather
easily summarized: Federal law governs questions of the exist-
ence and extent of federal grants, and state law determines the
riparian rights incidental to the grant. 8
In Bourgeois v. United States" a United States Court of
Claims recently ruled that title to an unsurveyed island in
Michigan belonged to the owner of the shoreline adjacent to the
16. 296 U.S. 10 (1935). The Court concluded that a question regarding the limit of
land conveyed concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States and
thus must be governed by federal law. Id. at 22. See also Kean v. Calumet Canal Co.,
190 U.S. 452, 461 (1903), where the dissent engaged in a thorough discussion of the
early law on the subject.
17. 389 U.S. at 295.
18. Further support for this proposition can be found in the case of Wilcox v.
Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 266, 276 (1839), wherein the Supreme Court stated suc-
cinctly,
Whenever the question in any court, state or federal, is whether a title to land
which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question
must be resolved by the laws of the United States, but that, whenever, according
to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other
property in the State, is subject to the State legislature, so far as that legislture
is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to
the laws of the United States.
See also St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868); Paige v.
Peters, 70 Wis. 178, 35 N.W. 328 (1887).
19. 545 F.2d 727 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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island as the successor in title from the original patentee. The
court noted that when reviewing a federal grant, interpretation
of the government's intent must involve an analysis of federal
case law, since the statutes are silent as to the construction of
federal patents. 0 The court held that under the federal deci-
sions "if the intent of the grantor is ambiguous and the govern-
ment grants shoreland along non-navigable waters, it also pas-
ses title to islands according to the law of the state in which
the property is located."'" The court drew a distinction between
the cases holding federal law pre-emptive and those declaring
state property law controlling. In the case of an unsurveyed
island situated in nonnavigable waters the question of title to
the island is governed by state law because of the states' right
to determine title to submerged lands within their borders.
22
However, islands surrounded by navigable water are governed
under federal law because of the federal government's interest
in the navigability of national waters.
The Bourgeois rationale can be extended to cover the selec-
tion of law problem in cases involving omitted Wisconsin shore-
line. When disputes over unsurveyed lands bordering mean-
dered lakes cannot be resolved through interpretation of the
United States patent, federal law looks to the law of the state
in which the disputed land is situated. As will be discussed
below, the federal decisions are very clear on the interpretation
of grants bordering meandered lakes. Thus, state law does not
determine the extent of federal patents where the dispute does
not involve title to submerged lands or lands below the mean
high water mark. However, once it has been determined that
title has been transferred from the federal government, the
property is subject to the state's rules of real property. 23 Thus,
state law governs disputes over boundaries between parcels of
land which were omitted from the official plat due to an erro-
neously meandered body of water.24
20. Id. at 729. See also Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
21. 545 F.2d at 731. See also Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229 (1913).
22. See, e.g., Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
23. It should be noted that in cases where a subsequent resurvey of meandered
lakeshore reveals land that was technically omitted from the original plat because of
an erroneous survey, one holding a patent issued prior to January 21, 1953, who has
held the land in peaceful, adverse possession may purchase that land and receive a
patent. 43 U.S.C. § 1221 (1970).
24. Wisconsin has a specific statute applicable to disputes over boundaries of tracts
of land bordering erroneously meandered lakes which also provides for the distribution
[Vol. 61:515
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THE FEDERAL PRESUMPTION
As indicated earlier, federal law determines the validity and
extent of federal grants." Mitchell v. Smale,"6 the leading case
on this subject, provides a clear statement of the federal pre-
sumption regarding the extent of such grants. Discussing the
rights of the original patentee to the unsurveyed peninsula, the
Court stated,
The difficulty of following the edge or margin of such projec-
tions, and all the various sinuosities of the water line, is the
very occasion and cause of running the meander line, which
by its exclusions and inclusions of such irregularities of con-
tour, produced an average result, clearly approximating to
the truth as to the quantity of the upland contained in the
front lots bordering on the lake or stream. The official plat
made from such survey does not show the meander line, but
shows the general form of the lake deducted therefrom and
the surrounding front lots adjoining and bordering on the
same. The patents when issued refer to this plat for identifi-
cation of the lots conveyed, and are equivalent to and are
bounded by the lake or stream.27
Thus, the owner of abutting lands is conclusively presumed to
hold to the actual shoreline absent a showing of fraud. Hardin
v. Jordan2 8 further clarified the rule with its statement that the
meander lines are run "for the purpose of ascertaining the exact
quantity of the upland to be charged for, and not for the pur-
pose of limiting the title of the grantee to such meander
lines. ' ' 29 The presumption is based on the rationale that there
is no reason why the government would reserve strips of land
along meandered lakes after conveying title to all surrounding
lands. The meander line was simply a convention designed to
provide a reasonably accurate means of approximating the
acreage in government lots so that the purchaser could be
of such lands where the same parcel is being claimed by two or more parties. Wis. STAT.
§ 30.10(4)(b) (1975).
25. See, e.g., Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511 (1905); Kean v. Calumet
Canal Co., 190 U.S. 452, 456 (1903); Fontenell v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 298 F.
Supp. 855, 861 (D. Neb. 1969); and text accompanying notes 15-18, supra.
26. 140 U.S. 406 (1891).
27. Id. at 413.
28. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
29. Id. at 380.
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charged an appropriate amount. It may not be considered a
boundary for purposes of limiting the extent of a federal grant.
30
WISCONSIN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL PRESUMPTION
Over the years the Wisconsin courts have not applied the
federal presumption with great fidelity. Perhaps the most strik-
ing Wisconsin aberration is the so-called "eighth-line" rule.
The rule developed from Whitney v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
3
'
where the court recognized that the patentee of lands shown on
the official plat to be bounded by lakeshore is presumed to take
title to the shore, but held that one cannot extend the search
for such shoreline beyond the next government subdivision
line. Later, in Lally v. Rossman,3 2 the patentee's search for the
actual shoreline was further restricted when the court declared
that the patentee must stop his search for the water's edge at
the next eighth-line.
The eighth-line rule imposes an obvious limitation on the
extent of federal grants in contravention of the federal pre-
sumption. When applying this test, the courts fail to give pro-
per deference to the government's intent or the circumstances
surrounding the original conveyance; the government is simply
presumed not to have intended to distribute land beyond the
next eighth-line." No attention is given to the quantity of omit-
ted land, so narrow strips of valuable land lying between the
subdivision line and the water's edge could remain technically
ungranted property.
At one time it appeared that the eighth-line rule had been
abandoned in Wisconsin. In Brown v. Dunn,34 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court appeared to adopt the federal presumption
when it held that the lakeshore is the boundary "however dis-
tant or variant from the position indicated for it by the mean-
der line."3 There was mention of both the Whitney and Lally
30. This rule was clearly stated in St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 272, 286 (1869), which has been cited in most decisions discussing title to trans-
meander property. See also United States v. Zager, 338 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
31. 78 Wis. 240, 47 N.W. 425 (1890).
32. 82 Wis. 147, 51 N.W. 1132 (1892).
33. There is some support for this position in Security Land & Exploration Co. v.
Burns, 193 U.S. 167 (1904), although there is no language that would support the
proposition that the crossing of a government subdivision line is to be construed as
more than one factor that may be considered in making a determination of governmen-
tal intent where that intent is vague.
34. 135 Wis. 374, 115 N.W. 1097 (1908).
35. Id. at 377, 115 N.W. at 1098.
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cases in the opinion, yet the eighth-line rule was conspicuously
omitted. However after a brief respite, the rule reappeared and
was approved in Wisconsin Realty Co. v. Lull,"6 which held that
the owner's right to move beyond the meander line to the natu-
ral boundary (in this case a river) was subordinate to a govern-
mental subdivision line if one had to be crossed to reach the
water.
The eighth-line rule was finally laid to rest after the rehear-
ing of Blatchford v. Voss,37 where the Wisconsin Court decided
that governmental intent is the controlling factor when inter-
preting the extent of a federal grant shown to be bounded by
a meandered lake. Although all of the earlier Wisconsin cases
considering the extent of federal grants have mentioned gov-
ernmental intent, this factor had never been given conclusive
effect-especially when a government subdivision line had to
be crossed to reach the shoreline.
Passage of section 30.10(4)(b) by the Wisconsin legislature
in 193138 should have remedied much of the uncertainty over
the extent of federal patents since it codified the federal pre-
sumption:
The boundaries of lands adjoining waters and the rights of
the state and of individuals with respect to all such lands and
waters shall be determined in conformity to the common law
so far as applicable. But in the case of a lake or stream erro-
neously meandered in the original U.S. government survey,
the owner of title to lands adjoining the meandered lake or
stream, as shown on such original survey, is, conclusively pre-
sumed to own to the actual shore lines unless it is first estab-
lished in a suit in equity, brought by the U.S. government for
that purpose, that the government was in fact defrauded by
such survey. If the proper claims of adjacent owners of ri-
36. 177 Wis. 53, 187 N.W. 978 (1922).
37. 197 Wis. 468, 222 N.W. 804 (1929). See also Baackes v. Blair, 223 Wis. 83, 269
N.W. 650 (1936).
38. The section was created in response to federal legislation passed in 1925 which
authorized the Secretary of Interior to dispose of lands that were determined to have
been omitted from the official government plat. The act applied to Wisconsin alone,
and allowed for redistribution of trans-meander property without a prior judicial deter-
mination of fraud. See 43 U.S.C. § 994 (1970).
For a complete discussion of the circumstances which gave rise to the passage of
the statute, see O'Melia & Kaye, The Status of Title to Lands Bordering on Erro-
neously Meandered Lakes (brief presented to the Wisconsin Legislature in connection
with ch. 154, Laws of 1931) (Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library).
1978]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
parian lots of lands between meander and actual shore lines
conflict, each shall have his proportion of such shore lands. 9
The first clear discussion40 Of the statute appears in Kind
v. Vilas County.4" There, three adjacent lots of approximately
77.5 acres were shown by the official government plat to be
bounded by a small lake. However, a private survey indicated
an error in the meandered shoreline totaling 4.6 acres. The
plaintiff, owner of one of the lots, claimed that his patent in-
cluded the actual shoreline. However, the county owned the
other two lots and claimed title to the disputed lakefront under
its original grant. Significantly, the court in Kind noted that
there need not always be only a single "winner" in disputes
between adjacent landowners who claim title to the same lake-
shore under the statute. Finding the case controlled by the last
sentence of section 30.10(4)(b), the court said, "we do not close
the door to a 100% award of a disputed parcel to one of two or
more disputing adjoining landowners. However it appears to us
that such award would have a finding that only one claim was
a 'proper claim' under the statute."42 The court then inter-
preted the statute to allow proportionate awards of the shore-
line based on "the factors that have been held relevant to a
search for the intent of the government at the time of making
the original survey."43 The court went on to state that
"previous cases dealing with intent remain relevant in seeking
guideines for an equitable, proportional division of the dis-
puted property.""
These pronouncements must be read in the narrow sense in
which they were intended to apply in order to avoid a revival
of the contradictory cases which were the law prior to the en-
39. Wis. STAT. § 30.10(4)(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
40. Reference to the statute was conspicuously absent from Weaver v. Knudson,
23 Wis. 2d 426, 127 N.W.2d 217 (1964), which followed federal decisions in holding a
lake's actual shoreline was the boundary where the lake had been erroneously mean-
dered. While the court did not apply the statute, although it seemed appropriate, the
case may be valuable for its holding that title to two parcels of land separated by a
nonmeandered lake passed to the patentee of the government lot within which the two
unconnected parcels were located.
In Blatchford v. Voss, 197 Wis. 461, 219 N.W. 100 (1929), the court expressly refused
to decide whether a government lot could be composed of two parcels of land separated
by a body of water.
41. 56 Wis. 2d 269, 201 N.W.2d 881 (1972).
42. Id. at 276, 201 N.W.2d at 885.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 277, 201 N.W.2d at 885.
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actment of section 30.10(4)(b). It should be noted that the
court in Kind was referring only to those surrounding circum-
stances which may be considered by a trial court in making an
equitable division of lakeshore that is claimed by two or more
owners holding under valid federal patents. By its unfortunate
reference to the eighth-line rule cases, the court did not intend
to reinstate it as an absolute rule. Such a reading of the deci-
sion would be in direct conflict with section 30.10(4) (b) and the
federal law on the subject. In addition to the eighth-line test,
the court listed other factors to be considered in apportioning
such lands: the possibility of one or more claimants being de-
prived of lake frontage, the total area of omitted land, the
topography and value of the land, the amount and quality of
each claimant's upland, and the amount of land held by each
claimant that actually borders on the disputed parcel.45
The Kind court's ruling that section 30.10 of the statutes
determines the boundaries of the disputed parcel after the
claimants establish the validity of their claims comports with
federal case law. Wisconsin's early decisions on meandered
lakes should not today be considered a source of precedent for
the courts to follow. Rather, they only outline factors to be
considered in making a proportionate distribution among the
adjoining land owners. While a court may still award an entire
disputed parcel to one claimant, it is no longer required to do
SO.
A recent discussion by the Wisconsin court on the problem
of erroneously meandered lakes presented a unique question.
State Commissioners of Board of Public Lands v. Thiel" in-
volved a dispute over ownership to two parcels of land which
together totaled less than ten acres. The original survey plat
had shown the state and the defendants as owners of adjacent
lots bounded by a meandered lake although a subsequent sur-
vey revealed a substantial variance between the actual lake
and the lake as it appeared on the official plat. Most of the
government lot held by the state was covered by the lake, and
only two triangular parcels, located at each of the lots' eastern
corners remained above water. The two parcels were separated
by the lake.
45. Id. at n.2.
46. 82 Wis. 2d 276, 262 N.W.2d 522 (1978).
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The state argued that its grant did not stop at the lake's
shore but extended across the meandered body of water to
include the southeast corner of the lot. Ownership of that cor-
ner would make the state an "adjacent landowner" within the
meaning of section 30.10(4)(b) to the second disputed parcel.
The second parcel consisted of technically omitted land adja-
cent to the defendant's lot and the disputed corner claimed by
the state. Arguing under the statute, the state contended that
it should be entitled to a proportionate distribution of the sec-
ond tract.
In its claim to title to the southeast corner, the state urged
the court to recognize an exception to the conclusive presump-
tion. If the presumption were held to control, the state would
be precluded from both parcels since the original plat showed
the southern end of its lot to be bounded by the meandered
lake. The court concluded that no additional exception to the
presumption existed,47 and that the state's claim for a propor-
tionate share of the second tract was therefore without merit.
The state was not an adjacent owner. It was noted that
"[m]eander lines have never been used so as to reach across
a body of water and take in a parcel on the opposite shore."48
However, the court then qualified that conclusion with its
statement that "it is not impossible for a lot to be composed
of two parcels separated by a body of water."49 Nevertheless,
47. Section 30.10 and the federal cases expressly recognize fraud as the only excep-
tion to the presumption. The fraud exception is discussed at pp. 527-32 infra.
In Thiel, the court specifically refused to extend the exception, stating that "[tihe
principle that grossly erroneous meander lines are to be treated as boundaries was
developed in response to surveys which erroneously omitted large areas of high land."
82 Wis. 2d at 286, 262 N.W.2d at 529. The court distinguished this principle from the
facts established in the case:
In the instant case, however, the erroneous survey had an opposite effect; the
original plat of survey grossly overstated the size of the lot. This court has never
applied the exception, or treated meander lines as boundaries, in similar cir-
cumstances. Nor has our research identified any such case in other jurisdictions.
Because the exception was developed to accommodate a different factual situa-
tion, and in response to different policy concerns, it should not be arbitrarily
extended to the instant case.
Id. at 287, 262 N.W.2d at 529.
48. Id. at 288, 262 N.W.2d at 530.
49. Id. The court recognized the preference for regularly shaped parcels and the
rectangular method of surveying and platting employed by the government. However,
a distinction was made for disputes involving nonmeandered bodies of water: "In such
cases, this court has held that conveyance by patent of a government lot passes title
to all upland in the designated lot, including unconnected parcels cut off from the
[Vol. 61:515
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after it declared that "the intent of the government in making
the original grant is always the controlling consideration in
determining the boundaries of the grant,"50 the court found
that government intent for such a conveyance was lacking in
the present case.
The Thiel case has reaffirmed the applicability of section
30.10(4)(b) to title disputes involving erroneously meandered
lakeshore. This reinforcement, coupled with the court's strict
adherence to the conclusive presumption contained in the stat-
ute makes it a valuable case. However, the question did not
arise as to the significance to be attached to governmental
subdivision lines which run between the meander line and the
actual shore. The answer to this question remains somewhat
unsettled by the court's reference to early cases which dealt
with government intent" and its statement that "the meander
lines will be considered boundaries where a governmental in-
tention to make them boundaries is shown. '52
FRAUD-THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
Throughout this article it has been stated that absent a
showing of fraud, a landowner depicted on the official plat as
owning to the shore of a meandered lake is conclusively pre-
sumed to own to the water's edge. A discussion of the circum-
stances in which fraud will preclude a presumed riparian owner
from obtaining title to claimed shoreline is necessary for a com-
plete understanding of the law affecting title to these techni-
cally omitted lands. Section 30.10(4)(b) mentions fraud as the
exception to the conclusive presumption, and also states that
only the United States, as the original grantor, can establish
fraud to defeat a landowner's claim to omitted lands. The
courts have experienced a great deal of difficulty determining
how inaccurate a survey must be before it will be deemed
fraudulent. As a result, meritorious claimants have at times
been denied title to valuable lakeshore property in cases where
there was only a small error in the original plat as to their
particular parcel.
remainder of the lot by a non-meandered lake." Id. at 289, 262 N.W.2d 530 (citations
omitted).
50. Id. at 284, 262 N.W.2d at 528.
51. Id. at 284-85, 262 N.W.2d at 528.
52. Id. at 285, 262 N.W.2d at 528.
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The federal cases which have discussed the issue of con-
structive fraud have made it clear that exceptions to the con-
clusive ownership presumption are difficult to establish. One
of the earliest cases to find a survey so inaccurate as to defeat
the claims of original patentees was French-Glenn Live Stock
Co. v. Springer,5" in which one hundred and fifty-eight acres
were omitted from the survey. The original survey indicated
that the land in dispute was covered by a lake. However, the
survey was made at a time when the area was flooded, and no
lake actually existed. In finding the error so gross as to justify
redistribution of the unsurveyed land, the Supreme Court
made it clear that if a lake had existed, the original patentee
of the adjoining land would have taken title to the actual shore-
line.54
Fraud was established in Security Land & Exploration Co.
v. Burns.5 5 The evidence showed that more than two sections
of land were left completely unsurveyed because no corners
could be located. In the area shown on the plat to be covered
by a large lake, there was actually a small lake surrounded by
lands that showed no evidence of ever being covered by water.
The court held that the entire survey was fraudulent, noting
that the actual shoreline was between one-half and one mile
away from its purported location on the plat. Other factors
considered relevant to the fraud inquiry included the large
amount of land claimed compared to the amount of land for
which the patentee had actually paid, and the need to go out-
side a government section line to reach the actual water.
A similar result was reached in Jeems Bayou Hunting &
Fishing Club v. United States,51 where the Court found that no
survey had ever been made, and held that the unusual
"circumstances as well as the extent and character of the lands
necessitate the conclusion that the omission was the result of
such gross and palpable error as to constitute in effect a fraud
upon the government." 5 It thus seems that the error must be
53. 185 U.S. 47, 54 (1902).
54. See also Lee Wilson & Co. v. United States, 245 U.S. 24 (1917), where the Court
held that the plat should control for the purpose of determining what land was in-
tended to be conveyed, because through fraud or mistake, what was shown on the plat
as a body of water was actually upland.
55. 193 U.S. 167 (1904).
56. 260 U.S. 561 (1923).
57. Id. at 564. See also Internal Improvement Fund v. Nowak, 401 F.2d 708, 716
(5th Cir. 1968).
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extreme and unjustifiable in order to give rise to a finding of
constructive fraud.
United States v. Zager5 illustrates the narrow scope of the
fraud exception. The case is especially relevant to Wisconsin
controversies since the case involved land situated in Forest
County. A resurvey indicated that 112.11 acres were erro-
neously omitted because of an incorrect meander line. The fed-
eral government claimed title to 74.56 acres of this land, which
it contended had never been transferred. The defendants
owned the lots adjoining the omitted acreage and claimed title
to the lands situated between their parcels and the water's
edge.
Holding that the mistake was not so gross as to constitute
constructive fraud, the court looked at the amount and propor-
tion of acreage between the meander line and the shore. It
stated that "this must be balanced with 'the circumstances
surrounding the original survey, and the type and comparative
value of the land at that time'."59 Both federal decisions and
relevant Wisconsin cases were considered. Particular attention
was given to the fact that no error involving less than one
hundred acres had previously been deemed constructive fraud
on the government. 0 The ratio of the surveyed land to the
omitted land was approximately two-to-one, and the land had
been underestimated by thirty-five percent in the original sur-
vey. The court also noted that the land was virtually worthless
in 1859 when the plat was accepted. Since the Zager court
looked to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the errors,
the facts of each case should determine whether the survey is
so inaccurate as to have been fraudulent. This analysis puts the
conflicting claims into a much better perspective than does a
simple comparison of total omitted acreage to an arbitrary fig-
ure.6
58. 338 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
59. Id. at 989, quoting Schultz v. Winther, 10 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 101 N.W.2d 631, 638
(1960).
60. The court noted that the 103 acres involved in Brothertown Realty Corp. v.
Reedal, 200 Wis. 465, 227 N.W. 390 (1930) was the smallest amount of acreage deemed
sufficient to establish constructive fraud.
61. The Zager court determined the percentage figure by dividing the sum of the
omitted acreage and the acreage shown on the official plat into the omitted acreage.
338 F. Supp. at 990.
See also Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 124 (10th Cir. 1969), in which an
omission of 323 acres was held to be gross error. The ratio of surveyed land to unsur-
veyed land was approximately one-to-three.
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The Wisconsin decisions, like those of the federal courts,
have consistently held that a mistake must amount to a
"gross" error in order to constitute fraud. While section
30.10(4)(b)of the Wisconsin Statutes now limits the availabil-
ity of the fraud exception by providing that only the federal
government may bring suit to establish fraud, Wisconsin cases
are still illustrative of the type of circumstances which might
be sufficient to defeat a variant survey.
In Brothertown Realty Corp. v. Reedal, a resurvey dis-
closed that more than one hundred acres, consisting mostly of
narrow strips of lakeshore frontage, had been omitted from the
original survey. The plaintiff brought an action to quiet title
to 19.37 acres of this land lying between the incorrect meander
line and the actual shore. He was shown on the government
plat to own 26.2 acres of land bordering the lake. Addressing
the question of fraud, the court stated that
where the original survey line departs so far from the true
meander line of a body of water as to leave so large a tract of
land unsurveyed as to indicate that the meander line was in
fact never run, then the survey will be held invalid as a con-
structive fraud upon the government. 3
The court then held that the quantity of land omitted was
sufficient to constitute fraud and defeat the original survey. It
also declared that all the omitted land must be considered as
a whole rather than just that portion of unsurveyed land
claimed by the adjoining owners. 4 The disputed parcel must
be included with all the adjoining omitted lands and the total
of the omitted acreage must then be compared to the sum of
the lands lying between the meander line and the actual shore.
This case presents a potential problem for owners of prop-
erty abutting a narrow strip of technically unsurveyed lake-
shore where the aggregate acreage of such unsurveyed lands
approaches one hundred acres. An owner could face the possi-
bility of losing the most valuable portion of his tract, regard-
less of the ratio of unsurveyed land to surveyed land or the dis-
tance between the erroneous meander line and the water's
edge. The Reedal case could be interpreted as yet another
contradictory rule for defining the extent of a federal grant
because of its conclusion that the original meander line may be
62. 200 Wis. 465, 227 N.W. 390 (1930).
63. Id. at 469, 227 N.W. at 392.
64. Id. at 470, 227 N.W. at 392.
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the border of a particular grant, rather than the actual shore-
line.
The effect of Reedal, however, was limited considerably by
Lakelands, Inc. v. Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co."5
The Lakelands court engaged in an extensive discussion of the
situations where an original survey will be invalidated because
of constructive fraud on the government. The owner of land
that was shown on the original plat to be bounded by a mean-
dered lake sued his grantor for breach of the covenants of seisin
and title under a warranty deed. The government had resurv-
eyed and replatted a portion of land claimed by the plaintiff,
who alleged that the resurvey deprived him of fifty-three acres
of his property.
Comparing the fifty-three acres involved in the dispute be-
fore the court with the 103 acres found to have been fraudu-
lently omitted in Reedal, the court stated that Reedal repre-
sented the "low limit" for a finding of constructive fraud in
Wisconsin. As further support for its position, the court noted
that the smallest amount of unsurveyed land which the United
States Supreme Court considered sufficient to constitute a
fraudulent omission was 158 acres in French-Glen Live Stock
Co. v. Springer."6 Fortunately, the Wisconsin court did not rely
solely upon the quantity of land omitted to make its fraud
determination as done in the Reedal case. Rather, the court
took notice of the fact that the greatest divergence between the
erroneous meander line and the shore was less than 900 feet,
and held that it was not such a gross departure as to constitute
a constructive fraud upon the government.
Perhaps the most significant part of the Lakelands decision
was the declaration that even where an entire survey is invali-
dated, "the title to separate parcels designated in the original
plat as marked by divisional lines and the meander line is good
where there is no such gross departure in the plats of those
parcels as to constitute constructive fraud."" This language
has relieved much of the potential for inequitable redistribu-
tion where the ratio of omitted lakeshore to the total acreage
of a particular tract is insignificant.
In Schultz v. Winther 8 the court again had an opportunity
65. 237 Wis. 326, 295 N.W. 919 (1931).
66. 185 U.S. 47 (1902).
67. 237 Wis. at 338, 295 N.W. at 924.
68. 10 Wis. 2d 1, 101 N.W.2d 631 (1960).
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to evaluate an original survey which omitted a large amount of
lakefront property. Based on a resurvey conducted in 1955,69
the government conveyed the land located between the shore
and the meander line established by the original government
survey of 1863. The plaintiffs brought an ejectment action
claiming one of the reconveyed parcels under a patent issued
to them in 1956. The defendant claimed superior title to the
land in question by an 1872 patent purporting to convey the
land up to the meandered lake. Noting that there is no exact
formula for making a determination of when an error is so gross
as to constitute constructive fraud, the Schultz court formu-
lated the two-part test later applied in Zager.7° First, the
amount of omitted acreage is compared to the acreage of the
tract within the meander line. The court then must determine
whether the survey fell below the "proper standard of accu-
racy," giving due regard "to the circumstances surrounding the
orignal survey, and the type and comparative value of the land
at that time. ' 71 Under this analysis, it is very difficult to defeat
the title of an adjacent landowner holding under an original
United States patent.72
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Kind and Thiel decisions, Wisconsin has
reduced much of the uncertainty that has plagued the body of
law governing the problem of meandered lakeshore. However,
there exists the potential for a reversion back to the early state
of confusion. Wisconsin has had a statute in effect since 1931
which provides an excellent mechanism for the equitable dis-
69. 43 U.S.C. § 772 (1970) provides for resurveys to mark undisposed of public
lands, but further provides: "No such resurvey or retracements shall be so executed
as to impair the bona fide rights or claims of any claimant, entryman, or owner of lands
affected by such resurvey or retracement."
See also United States v. Reimann, 504 F.2d 135, 138 (10th Cir. 1974), which held
that "once a patent has been issued, the rights of the patentees are fixed and the
government has no power to interfere with these rights as by a corrective resurvey."
70. 338 F. Supp. at 989.
71. 10 Wis. 2d at 12, 101 N.W.2d at 638.
72. In State Commissioners of Board of Public Lands v. Thiel, discussed supra, at
000-000, the state argued that the error in running the meander lines of a lake consti-
tuted constructive fraud. The court held that using the boundaries depicted on the
plat, which included the meander line, would enlarge the state's lot rather than limit
it. Since the fraud exception is only to be applied where large areas of uplands had
been erroneously omitted, the argument was not helpful to the state's case. See note
47, supra.
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tribution of technically omitted lands in a fashion consistent
with the federal decisions which define the extent of a federal
patent. The courts should rely on Kind for guidance in making
a fair distribution among adjacent owners with valid but con-
flicting claims to the land. However, caution must be used to
prevent Kind from being interpreted as a reinstatement of the
older cases as available rules of decision for trial courts to apply
as they see fit. In this respect, Thiel's strict compliance with
section 30.10(4) (b) is important in establishing the proper rules
to be followed.
It is clear that when the United States distributes land
according to the official plat, and the plat depicts meander
lines along the margin of an existing body of water, the actual
shoreline defines the extent of the grant. Thus, the owner of
land which is shown to abut a lake or stream on the official
government plat is presumed, absent a showing of fraud, to
hold to the water's edge.
Wisconsin, however, has not confined its jurisdiction to sub-
merged lands within the state, but has actually limited the
extent of federal patents by the creation of rules in direct con-
flict with the federal decisions. Application of section
30.10(4)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes should preclude the use
of these conflicting rules, and provide for a more orderly and
equitable distribution of lands situated on erroneously mean-
dered lakes.
JAN H. OHLANDER
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